Syria Returns To Arab Diplomacy
For much of the past decade, Syria has been marginalized in terms of diplomatic engagements within the Arab region due to the region-wide condemnation of President Bashar Assad's crackdown on the 2011 protests-turned-civil war. However, there has recently been an acceleration in efforts to restore ties, as evidenced by Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad's visits to Arab capitals such as Cairo, Amman, and Tunis. Subsequent to the visit, a gathering of Arab countries was held in Jeddah in early May 2023 to discuss the objective of ending Syria's decade-long expulsion. During this meeting, the Arab League's decision to reinstate the Syrian government's membership — suspended since the incident in 2011. These steps indicate a potential rapprochement and a move towards normalizing relations between several Arab nations and the Assad regime.
While the normalization of this relationship may have political implications, it is unlikely to alleviate the protracted suffering endured by the Syrian population throughout the past decade. Syrians have faced the harrowing consequences of civil war, including state-sanctioned brutality and the presence of extremist groups, resulting in an enduring humanitarian crisis.
Incentives For Normalization
According to political expert Osama Danura, since the Arab nations have come to realize the limitations of the Western-led approach - which are characterized by threats, economic sanctions, and social blockades - in providing a solution to the Syrian conflict, they concluded that de-escalation and regional coordination served their interests better than confrontation.
First, the persisting root causes of the conflict in Syria have not been effectively addressed, leading to a reluctance among refugees in neighboring states to return to their homeland, which poses challenges for countries like Jordan and Lebanon who are already grappling with political and economic issues. To tackle this issue, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been advocating for an "Arab-led political path" that recognizes the importance of engaging with Syria to facilitate meaningful negotiations with President Assad. Moreover, the repercussions of the Syrian Civil War have had destabilizing effects on Arab countries and the international community, leading to compromised border security, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and refugee crisis. In response to these challenges, the Arab countries are now actively reestablishing connections with Syria, seeking to reverse the negative impact, and pursuing an Arab-driven resolution to the prolonged Syrian crisis. This approach aims to achieve a win-win situation by combating destabilization and fostering regional stability.
Another rationale behind the normalization of relations with Syria is the convergence of Arab authoritarian regimes against democratic aspirations and Islamist movements. This can be observed in the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a terrorist organization by countries including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain during the period of 2013–2014. The Arab-Arab split emerged when this quartet boycotted Qatar in 2017, reflecting a backlash against Islamists. It is evident that, aside from Egypt, the supporters of Syria’s admission to the Arab League hold concerns about Islamist and democratic demands within their respective domestic contexts. As a result, the support for Syria's readmission to the Arab League serves as a collective strategy by Arab authoritarian regimes to counter both democratic aspirations and Islamist movements in the region.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the recent earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey in February 2023 has played a role in accelerating efforts towards normalization. The devastating natural disaster presented an opportunity for neighboring countries and the international community to extend humanitarian aid and assistance to those affected. This act of providing crucial support not only helped alleviate the suffering of the affected population but also created a platform for dialogue and cooperation between the involved parties. Moreover, the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran has the potential to positively contribute to the overall climate of rapprochement in the region. The thawing of tensions between these two influential regional powers opens doors for enhanced diplomatic engagement and a more constructive approach towards addressing conflicts, including the Syrian crisis. As Saudi Arabia and Iran begin to find common ground on certain issues, it may further bolster the push for normalized relations with the Assad regime.
Effects on Stakeholders
For Syrian refugees, while normalization could potentially improve their freedom of movement and access to aid over time, challenges persist, particularly in areas beyond the government's control. Approximately half of Syria's pre-war population, around 21 million people, have been internally displaced or have become refugees in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. In host countries, like Jordan and Lebanon, where economic crises are already straining resources, Syrian refugees are often viewed as a burden. Anti-refugee sentiment has grown, and there are calls from populist politicians to repatriate Syrians, despite the dangers they would face. Reports from human rights groups, including Amnesty International, highlight the risks faced by returning refugees, such as imprisonment, abuse, and sexual violence. Furthermore, the readmission creates uncertainty for Syrians who are still outside the country, potentially leading many to consider fleeing to other countries, with Europe being a preferred destination. Thus, the implications for Syrian refugees, dissidents, and minority communities are uncertain, with questions surrounding the regime's willingness to engage in dialogue and protect returning refugees from reprisals or discrimination.
On Syrian-Arab relations, Some observers argue that Syria's reintegration into the Arab world represents a significant step towards deterring foreign intervention and fostering positive relations among the Arab states and regional countries. They believe that without foreign agendas, the Arab nations could potentially facilitate a political solution for Syria to be welcomed within the Arab world. Others caution that while there is a shift towards constructive engagement, it does not imply the immediate establishment of warm peace among Arab adversaries or between Arab regimes and Iran. Some foreign governments, including the United States, remain skeptical of this change in stance by the Arab nations. Tensions between President Assad and the regimes that previously sought to overthrow him have not disappeared. However, this evolving security architecture reflects how regional actors are adapting to broader geopolitical shifts. With the diminished role of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of a multipolar international order, Arab regimes have taken on a greater share of the regional security burden. This shift has allowed them to prioritize their own regional threats and explore partnerships beyond the United States, including with China. While this framework may not resolve all regional divisions, it has the potential to prevent durable rivalries from escalating into open conflict. If successful, the emerging security framework could signify significant development for the Arab world—a locally organized, post-Cold War, post-Pax Americana security arrangement. However, it is important to recognize that the dynamics between Arab states, as well as their relationships with Iran and other regional actors, are complex and multifaceted.
In terms of international attitudes, there are indications that U.S. diplomats tacitly support the decision made by their Arab League allies, seeing it as a positive example of regional leadership. Jordan's foreign minister has also confirmed that the Arab League initiative on Syria was coordinated with the United States. However, Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, has criticized the Biden administration's shifting response to normalization efforts, describing it as "deplorable." Meanwhile, both the United States and the European Union maintain their longstanding positions, with the U.S. State Department spokesperson stating that they do not believe Syria should be readmitted to the Arab League at this time.
Lack of a Long-Term Solution in Sight
While normalization efforts may bring temporary benefits, they are unlikely to provide a long-term solution to Syrian-Arab relations. The Syrian regime's historical intransigence and reliance on the drug trade as a key source of income raise doubts about its willingness to make meaningful concessions. Additionally, even if the Syrian state desired to cooperate, its limited capabilities pose challenges, even in the areas controlled by the regime. Given these circumstances, the prospects for meaningful policy-making appear uncertain. While normalization alone may not immediately alter the situation on the ground, it could potentially lead to significant consequences in the future.
References
Arab League readmits Syria after 12-year suspension – DW – 05/07/2023. (2023, May 7). Dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/arab-league-readmits-syria-after-12-year-suspension/a-65542134
Council on Foreign Relations. (2011). The Arab League. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/arab-league
Heydemann, S. (2023, May 10). Syria’s normalization signals a new Middle Eastern order. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/syrias-normalization-signals-a-new-middle-eastern-order/
https://www.facebook.com/middleeasteye. (2023, April 4). Jordan’s plan for Syria normalisation: Refugees, drugs and militias. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-syria-plan-normalisation-refugees-drugs-militias
Miller, J. (2023, May 19). Syrian Normalization and Arab Countries’ Shift: Implications, Challenges, and US Interests | Continental Defence. Continental Defence. https://continental-defence.com/syrian-normalization-and-arab-countries-shift-implications-challenges-and-us-interests
Robinson, K. (2023, May 11). Syria Is Normalizing Relations With Arab Countries. Who Will Benefit? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/syria-normalizing-relations-arab-countries-who-will-benefit
Schwab, M. K., Regine. (2023, May 16). Arab States’ Incentives Towards (not) Normalizing Relations with Syria – Islamists and Drug Trafficking? PRIF BLOG. https://blog.prif.org/2023/05/16/arab-states-incentives-towards-not-normalizing-relations-with-syria-islamists-and-drug-trafficking/
Syria-Arab League Normalization Signals Change in Strategies. (2023, June 27). Www.telesurenglish.net. https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Syria-Arab-League-Normalization-Signals-Change-in-Strategies-20230627-0008.html
Comments