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Darrell Pui

AUKUS and its Implications on Southeast Asia and China

Updated: Jun 10



The Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly significant regarding its geopolitical surroundings, with the United States and China expanding their influence over this contested area. Against its backdrop, relations between both superpowers have been strained by mutual economic sanctions aimed to hobble the other’s semiconductor industry. Amid this trade war, an arms race is unfurling in the Indo-Pacific. From the accelerated use of artificial islands to conduct military operations to its controversial and unlawful imposition over the South China Sea through the nine-dash line, China’s aggression in the region is indubitably ballooning. This has, unsurprisingly, been met by backlash from the United States, with it condemning Beijing’s efforts to establish a maritime empire.


This follows China’s years of economic proliferation which enabled its accelerating military buildup. Beijing now possesses the world’s second largest defense budget, the largest conventional missile force, and the biggest navy and coast guard. Its growing dominance is equally backed by its technological strength through recent breakthroughs, such as operating high energy laser beams indefinitely or maintaining contact with underwater drones across 30,000 sq km. Each advancement edges China closer to dominating the global tech race. To combat its hegemonic ambitions, the United States’ solution is AUKUS.


Established in 2021, AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between the United States, UK, and Australia, with a strong focus on technology and information sharing. Its establishment was a historic shift in the United States' techno-nationalist and inwards looking stance, aiming at Australia's acquisition of nuclear powered submarines. Australia would now be the only country besides the UK that the US shares its nuclear propulsion technology with. 


One way AUKUS aims to challenge China’s presence is its ‘Advanced Capabilities Pillar’ (Pillar II). The partners will collaborate on advancing a “collective understanding” of AI, autonomous and “leading edge” technologies to support Indo-Pacific security and stability, noted the UK Minister of Defence. Whilst Australia’s acquisition of submarines (under Pillar I) largely dominated headlines, the potential of Pillar II should not be underestimated. If carried out successfully, it could enhance the progress and compatibility among forefront innovations such as robotic and self-governing subaquatic apparatus, artificial intelligence (AI), and electronic warfare mechanisms. Development of these military assets is critical in countering China’s increasingly aggressive maritime and amphibious operations in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Such incidents, like the recent use of water cannons against a Philippine supply boat, are becoming common.


However, AUKUS has its own implementational shortcomings. Whilst the plan seeks a robust and interconnected Western resistance against China, there are significant hurdles regarding collaborative technological advancement.  


The International Traffic of Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of US trade regulations, rendered weaponry and information sharing incredibly onerous. Under ITAR, many of the proposed items are banned from export unless institutional partners agree to intrusive and rigorous oversight - conditions that not only make the process of acquisition burdensome, but also dissuade companies from joining. 


Whilst President Joe Biden announced plans to amend legislation to streamline technology sharing with Australia, it could take years before these changes get accepted and implemented--years in which China continues to grow its technological prowess and dominance. Delays here not only hamper the aims of Pillar I, but also significantly decelerates progress under Pillar II. Such worries are exacerbated by the Australian Strategy Policy Institute’s (ASPI) recent findings that China is leading research in 19 of 23 technologies set as AUKUS priorities. ASPI also found that China commands a lead on hypersonics research and electronic watergate, amounting to imminent military threats for the West. Accordingly, hypersonic aircraft and weapons that travel five times faster than the speed of sound and autonomous underwater support vehicles which conduct long range missions without a remote operator are assets in development.


Given China's intentions, a persistent lead in technology intensifies the threat of regional conflict. Beijing's response to AUKUS seems to support this. Terming the agreement as a ‘path of error and danger’, China accused the United States of exacerbating a “Cold War Mentality”, and insidious intentions of proliferating nuclear activities. Furthermore, it increased military operations in the Pacific, conducting combat readiness drills in waters abutting Taiwan and banning vessels in the contested waters of Paracel Islands. It is unlikely that Chinese retaliation will diminish given the goal of a 40% naval expansion by 2040 and exponential budget increases, second only to the US.


Neighboring states have reacted to the developing technological race. US aligned countries, like the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan, voiced their support of AUKUS, and its contribution to regional security. Due to disputes with China over the South China Sea, their welcoming of the security pact is unsurprising. Even South Korea, which is not usually belligerent towards China, supports AUKUS. This is proof of the pact's appeal as acquiring collective nuclear capacities could bolster South Korea's position in its own security struggle with the North. In Southeast Asia, there has been little support or pushback (barring the Philippines) as both superpowers are relevant economic partners with countries in the area. Rather, Indonesia and Malaysia remained cautious about AUKUS, being “partly reassured” by Australia’s promise for peace. However, this contrasts with their initial rejection of the pact, a change possibly emblematic of China’s image as a potential danger in the region. 


As AUKUS developed over the past 2 years, the strategic makeup of the region also grew clearer. Since Indo-Pacific countries have generally remained supportive, or at least ambivalent, the United States has shown no plans of diminishing its regional influence. The recent signing of a trilateral economic agreement with Japan and South Korea furthers the West’s agenda to reduce Indo-Pacific states’ reliance on China. Moreover, AUKUS is open to membership expansion, provided states contribute proactively to the pact, something both New Zealand and Japan have expressed interest in. 


With the odds seemingly stacked against it, China has not stood by idly. Earlier last year, China signed a police cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands, and have begun talks to establish economic partnerships with South Pacific island nations. Such talks provide a boost to China’s “offshore economic ambitions” as US influence spreads in the region. However, a potential pact is not expected soon, with past partnerships like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) having taken 10 years to finalize. Therefore, it is unlikely that China will rely on economic and security partnerships to combat AUKUS’ influence. Rather, it will probably continue to further its lead in technology, with a race to the bottom between the two superpowers seeming inevitable. 


In the face of a challenge to the global order, AUKUS stands as the newest strategic instrument in the arsenal aimed at mitigating Chinese influence. It symbolizes the United States’ willingness to adopt novel approaches to geopolitics, and its focus on technology makes it an integral asset to its members and other countries in the region. Paired with the prospect of joint exercises, it makes the US proposition of a united front increasingly appealing. However, this also pushes China to retaliate, given the possibility for AUKUS to thwart its ambitions. In a bid to secure the region, AUKUS has irrefutably heightened tensions. Time will tell whether AUKUS can force China to back down or if it will exacerbate its assertiveness on the geopolitical chessboard.



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